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Networks and mobility:  
A case for complementary pathways
Martin Wagner & Caitlin Katsiaficas 
Complementary pathways have gained much prominence in 
recent global and European policy discussions as an inno-
vative and new tool to broaden and scale up third-country 
solutions for refugees. Indeed, the need for ramping up 
access to durable solutions for refugees is pressing in the face 
of ever longer-lasting conflicts and far too low resettlement 
numbers. While complementary pathways are commonly 
considered as new legal pathways that need to be developed 
for refugees, thereby perpetuating the narrative of refugees 
needing support while neglecting their human and social 
capital, various examples show that refugees do possess and 
use existing pathways and seek individual solutions outside 
of the refugee regime—if their resources and networks allow 
them to do so. Based on various examples, this policy brief, 
therefore, argues that facilitating movement for forced mi-
grants based on their human and social capital could become 
the key added value of complementary pathways.
Central findings and policy implications
1 Refugees use their social and professional networks to seek 
third-country solutions if their human, social, and financial 
capital allows them to do so—often without even entering 
into any formal refugee regime. 
2 While the most vulnerable refugees require a high level of 
support, which is offered through (admittedly little) resettle-
ment, the key added value of complementary pathways could 
be to support refugees whose human or social capital exists 
but is too weak to seek third-country solutions on their own.    
3 Devising strategies that develop and link networks in major 
host countries with those in potential destination countries 
farther afield and creating favourable entry conditions for 
refugees could become essential building blocks for comple-
mentary pathways. 
4 The German Western Balkans Regulation, community spon-
sorship or similar initiatives are examples of the opportuni-
ties created by networks and offer a plethora of findings that 
could further develop complementary pathways for refugees. 
5 From a governance perspective, complementary pathways are 
at the cross-section between protection and regular migration 
on the one hand and home and development/humanitarian 
affairs on the other. Progress on complementary pathways, 
therefore, requires overcoming sectoral governance ap-
proaches and seeking synergies between these spheres.
1	 An	introduction	to	complementary 
pathways
How the concept developed
“Complementary pathways” is quite a recent term in internation-
al protection. Nearly 20 years ago, Noll (2003, p. 11) referred to 
“protected entry procedures” when he considered “resettlement 
alone as too mono-dimensional and too limited to bring relief 
in the[access] crisis.” Some 10 years later, Hein and Donato 
(2012, pp. 24-29) referred to “complementary forms of access 
to protection” to describe “diplomatic asylum, protected entry 
procedures, resettlement and evacuation and dispersal.” 
At the global policy level, the term ‘complementary pathways’ 
most likely premiered in the 66th Standing Committee of the UN 
High Commissioner for Refugees, which looked into new ap-
proaches to expand access to solutions for refugees. Since then, 
the term has become increasingly prominent in global protection 
discussions, ultimately finding its way into the New York Decla-
ration. This landmark document listed complementary path-
ways in line with the three traditional durable solutions (return, 
local integration and resettlement), suggesting the emergence 
of a fourth durable solution. The resulting Global Compact on 
Refugees contained multiple references and an entire chapter on 
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complementary pathways (section 94). Additionally, a concrete 
initiative developed out of the Global Compact, the CRISP - 
Sustainable Resettlement and Complementary Pathways Initia-
tive, led jointly by the International Organization for Migration 
(IOM) and UNHCR to support stakeholders in creating and 
expanding refugee resettlement and complementary pathways. 
At the EU-level, institutions have brought forward policy  
options for the establishment of “safe and legal avenues”  
(European Parliament, 2016) to enable protection seekers to 
reach the European Union or “orderly and safe pathways to the 
EU for third-country nationals in need of protection” (European 
Commission, 2016). While the European Commission published 
recommendations for EU member states under the Commission 
Recommendation on enhancing legal pathways for persons in 
need of international protection in September 2017, complemen-
tary pathways as such only entered EU asylum and migration 
policy under the New Pact on Migration and Asylum, introduced 
in September 2020. With the Recommendation on legal path-
ways to protection in the EU: promoting resettlement, humani-
tarian admission, and other complementary pathways, released 
alongside the New Pact, the Commission is promoting the use of 
complementary pathways for those in third countries who are in 
need of international protection. 
What complementary pathways are now 
Since complementary pathways emerged, policymakers and 
scholars have tried to conceptualise and define them; however, 
these efforts have met with limited success. Rather than devel-
oping a concrete definition in both academic and policy circles, 
they list various initiatives that may fall under the complementa-
ry pathways umbrella, such as humanitarian visas, humanitarian 
admission, community sponsorship, or existing legal pathways 
for family reunification, education opportunities, employment 
opportunities or “other opportunities” (UNHCR, 2019). Com-
plementary pathways in this respect are described as “migration 
channels which, though not always originally designed for 
international protection, can complement resettlement schemes” 
(OECD, 2016). 
There have been several attempts to categorise complementary 
pathways. For instance, the European Council on Refugees and 
Exiles (ECRE) differentiated between forms of legal admission 
rooted in the international protection regime (resettlement, 
humanitarian admission programmes, private sponsorship and 
humanitarian visas) and those rooted in regular migration and 
mobility schemes (family reunification, labour migration and 
education mobility) (ECRE, 2017). More recently, Wood (2020) 
distinguished between needs-based (e.g. humanitarian visas or 
humanitarian admission programmes) and qualification-based 
(family, employment or education) complementary pathways 
on the one hand and ‘custom-made’ complementary pathways 
versus regular migration channels on the other. The latter refers 
to whether the pathway has been specifically developed for 
refugees or whether it is generally open for migrants, including 
refugees.
Despite their growing popularity, not everyone agrees with 
the concept. Of particular concern are pathways that are not 
specifically designed for refugees and displaced people (i.e. 
non-humanitarian, regular migratory pathways) and that offer for 
some only a temporary solution. Additionally, while comple-
mentary pathways are heavily promoted in global and EU policy 
documents, they have so far triggered less interest among states. 
The narrative that refugees need protection and support above 
all else does not fit with the image of refugees capitalising upon 
their resources, connections and skills to access third-country 
solutions beyond the classical ones reserved for them, namely 
resettlement, humanitarian admission or claiming international 
protection upon arrival in a destination country. With refugee 
issues usually separated from legal migration agendas, one of the 
challenges of promoting complementary pathways is to identify 
policymakers responsible for taking up the issue (i.e. which de-
partment or ministry). Complementary pathways are, therefore, 
one of the cases where the strict divide between categories like 
migrants and refugees is unproductive (Wagner, 2017).
What complementary pathways could be
Complementary pathways thus far have been addressed via 
a top-down approach. Global and EU policy documents (e.g. 
the Global Compact and New Pact on Migration and Asylum) 
address states and encourage them to provide pathways that 
refugees and displaced people can access. While laudable, the 
development of this policy approach is largely detached from 
displaced people and their social capital (family ties or profes-
sional networks), their human capital (skills) or their economic 
capital (financial resources).
Complementary pathways could well be understood as an inter-
mediate third-country solution between resettlement and legal 
pathways, which may overlap in both directions (see Figure 1). 
Resettlement as a protection tool offers a third-country solution 
to the most vulnerable refugees—those who have no social or 
professional connections or financial means. Well-connected 
refugees, on the contrary, may fully rely on their own capac-
ities (financial means or skills) and social relations (strong 
professional or private networks) to find protection and better 
long-term opportunities on their own. They are likely to use 
legal migration pathways. Complementary pathways, in turn, 
may offer third-country solutions for those in-between. As will 
Figure	1:	Third-country	solutions	for	refugees 
©	ICMPD,	Martin	Wagner,	Camilla Fogli
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Existing pathways that leverage networks
Several existing pathways tap into these personal and profes-
sional networks, either at the individual or organisational level, 
and overlap with many of those channels deemed to be comple-
mentary pathways.
Naturally, family relations (often) offer powerful networks and 
notably come with a legal right to family reunification for 
refugees. Migration pathways for family reasons have tradi-
tionally contained elements of sponsorship, including proof of 
employment, financial means or adequate housing. Exceptions 
may be made for certain groups of sponsors, most commonly for 
refugees and those with subsidiary protection. However, family 
reunification is mostly limited to nuclear family members and 
thus does not address more distant relations. Moreover, dis-
placed people often face particular barriers to family reunifica-
tion as they often cannot obtain birth and marriage certificates 
and other documents due to the specific circumstances under 
which they had to flee.
Another way networks have been leveraged is scholarship 
programmes in various countries like Mexico, Japan or Aus-
tralia for students who have been displaced (Wood & Evans, 
2020). In Europe, the Portuguese-led Global Platform for Syrian 
Students started to build networks for students already in 2013 to 
receive education or finalise studies that were interrupted by the 
conflict in Syria.
On refugee labour mobility, the organisation Talent Beyond 
Boundaries (TBB) has received perhaps the most attention, as 
it is the most advanced example. In essence, TBB connects the 
talents and skills of refugees in major hosting countries like 
Jordan or Lebanon with employers in Western countries via a 
specifically designed “Talent Catalogue”. Other initiatives look 
into intra-EU mobility based on refugees’ skills, as explored by 
the EU agency Cedefop or moveurope!. Numerous civil society 
networks like Startup refugees in Finland, More than one Per-
spective in Austria and Workeer in Germany have emerged at the 
national level to connect refugees with employers, while busi-
nesses are also creating networks, such as the TENT Partnership 
for Refugees. 
A tool that has received much attention of late is community 
sponsorship, a community-based approach mostly linked to 
resettlement schemes that enables private citizens and organi-
sations to welcome refugees to their country. Under Canada’s 
long-standing programme, community sponsorship can facili-
tate the actual journey of refugees to the country and also assist 
with their reception and integration. However, the concept of 
community sponsorship is flexible and can be applied to various 
migration pathways beyond resettlement. Indeed, it offers an 
array of possibilities for communities, civil society and the 
private sector to engage in welcoming refugees. It thus creates 
be presented below, refugees are striving to capitalise on their 
networks and find a solution to their displacement, which in-
cludes mobility via existing migratory pathways. In this sense, 
complementary pathways can help to bring and settle refugees 
in third countries by supporting them in building new networks 
and leveraging or restoring interrupted and weak networks. 
Complementary pathways, in this understanding, shall not 
necessarily provide new pathways that offer more exclusive 
mobility rights to refugees but rather shall develop policies that 
allow them to use their social capital, skills and resources as 
well as their professional or social networks.
2	The	potential	of	networks	for	tapping	
into mobility
The role of networks
The role of networks, particularly migrant networks, has long 
been emphasised in migration theory and academic debate. 
Migrant networks have been conceptualised as “sets of in-
terpersonal ties that connect migrants, former migrants, and 
non-migrants in origin and destination areas through ties of 
kinship, friendship and shared community origin” (Massey et 
al., 2005, p. 42). More recent discourses, however, show that 
the understanding that migrants are mainly navigating within 
migrant networks only addresses part of the plurality of exist-
ing networks. It neglects the relevance of other facilitators such 
as universities, employers or governments, and the rising role 
of the Internet in providing access to information and new net-
works via various online platforms or social media (Meeteren & 
Pereira, 2018). However, they also acknowledge that the social 
capital potentially available in networks is not always made 
readily accessible but rather “needs to be mobilised through 
networking strategies” (Meeteren & Pereira, 2018, p. 941). This 
points to the importance of cultivating and leveraging refugees’ 
networks.
The research project Transnational Figurations of Displacement 
(TRAFIG) investigates the importance of mobility and net-
works in finding solutions for displaced persons facing protract-
ed situations. The central hypothesis is that the more connected 
and mobile refugees and displaced people are, the less likely it 
is that they end up in situations of protracted displacement and 
vice versa. TRAFIG research in the Horn of Africa, the Middle 
East and Europe shows that displaced people rely heavily on 
their capital and networks. Their networks may include family 
members or friends living abroad, professional connections in 
other cities or countries or educational prospects. However, it 
is not just the quantity of contacts but rather their quality that 
influences the opportunities these networks can help unlock 
(for more, see Etzold et al., 2019). Thus, while refugees seek 
to tap into their networks, policymakers and practitioners can 
play a role in supporting the building and strengthening of these 
networks (Katsiaficas et al., 2021).
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Five years after the regulation took effect, the first evaluations 
documented that, between November 2015 and May 2020, 
around 244,000 preliminary approvals for applicants for em-
ployment from the Western Balkans in Germany were granted; 
57,750 were rejected (Brücker et al., 2020). For the purpose 
of this policy brief, the assessed importance of networks is 
even more relevant: According to a report by the Institute for 
Employment Research (IAB), the majority of the regulation’s 
beneficiaries relied on personal or professional relations. Only 
in some isolated instances did citizens of the six Western Balkan 
countries benefit from the regulation without the support of any 
networks (Brücker et al., 2020). 
Ultimately, the combination of networks and the facilitation of 
mobility allowed approximately 98,000 citizens from the West-
ern Balkans to arrive and work legally in Germany based on this 
regulation and to meet the needs of the German labour market. 
This model does not need to be limited to the Western Balkans 
and could well be used to expand solutions via more mobility 
options for refugees. 
3 The role of networks and mobility for 
complementary pathways
Forcibly displaced people are certainly not a homogenous 
group—not only because of their varying nationalities or ethnic 
backgrounds but foremost because of the different levels of 
human, social and financial capital that they possess. Indeed, 
as outlined by UNHCR, “how a displaced person fares in the 
future, whether in the country of asylum or origin or in a third 
country, depends on the skills, experiences and qualifica-
tions, mental and physical health, material assets and attitudes 
maintained and developed while displaced” (2016, section 6). 
While this is true for local integration, it is also true regarding 
third-country solutions.
As visualised in Figure 2, the human, social and financial capital 
of refugees not only has a substantial impact on third-country 
solutions that are open to them but also on the level of support 
they need to compensate for no or weak human, social or finan-
cial capital. This policy brief argues that three general groups 
of third-country solutions can be envisioned to correspond with 
different refugee profiles:
1 Those with strong networks and financial means need little to 
no support to access existing legal pathways.
2 Those with limited capital and weak networks will need 
targeted support to strengthen their networks and allow 
flexibility regarding access to third countries, namely via 
complementary pathways.
3 Those with high protection needs because of limited to no 
relevant capital or networks continue to rely primarily on 
resettlement.
an umbrella for all sorts of networks that can support refugees. 
However, existing networks such as family relations often do not 
play an important role or are even considered as a hindrance to 
community sponsorship. Many current community sponsorship 
programmes, such as those in the United Kingdom and Germa-
ny, do not provide the option to select family members or ‘name’ 
other persons to sponsor, even though many refugees and other 
migrants living in Europe and other third countries have fre-
quently requested this and would be ready to set up supporting 
communities to welcome members of their own networks. 
Digitalisation also offers plenty of opportunities to bridge long 
distances and make translocal and transnational networks come 
alive. These include opening up new opportunities, markets and 
networks to people who would otherwise be marginalised from 
mainstream economic avenues by virtue of their displacement 
(Easton-Calabria, 2019). Digital platforms may also increase the 
visibility of refugees’ human and social capital to employers or 
universities abroad (see various examples in Easton-Calabria, 
2019, p. 9).
Leveraging networks to enable mobility
Particularly in the EU context, complementary pathways are 
mainly discussed with respect to new or alternative migratory 
routes. However, pathways do exist, and networks appear to 
be vital in accessing these. Once a network offers a solution 
(e.g. a job offer, student scholarship or family reunion), states 
should facilitate entry by, for instance, easing requirements 
such as qualifications, student certificates, marriage documents 
or other formal requirements which refugees may not possess, 
or by broadening the definition of family members who can be 
reunited. 
The rationale for eased entry seems justified when the purpose of 
migration has been defined, and a network (community spon-
sorship, the family, a university or an employer) is in place to 
welcome the refugee and support them in settling in. As it was 
put, “contemporary approaches toward forced migrants focus on 
securing protection and providing assistance, not on facilitating 
movement” (Aleinikoff, 2018, p. 1). In this vein, facilitating 
movement for forced migrants based on their human and social 
capital could become the key added value of complementary 
pathways. 
When networks meet mobility: Germany’s Western Balkans 
Regulation
Although the German Western Balkans Regulation (Bundes-
agentur für Arbeit, n.d.), introduced in 2016, does not address 
people in need of international protection per se, it is an example 
of the power of networks to foster mobility. This policy opened 
the German labour market to all skill and qualification levels 
of migrants from the Western Balkans, including low-skilled 
migrants. Instead of calling for certain language or professional 
qualifications, the regulation requires applicants to have been 
offered a job from an employer in Germany for which no eligible 
candidate in Germany can be found.
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In comparison, during this same period, nationals of these seven 
countries submitted four million asylum applications, 2.2 mil-
lion people were granted refugee status or subsidiary protection, 
and 572,000 refugees were resettled to OECD countries and 
Brazil (OECD & UNHCR, 2021).
Following this exercise and based on Eurostat data on first-time 
residence permits issued for major source countries of refugees 
with a high protection need (determined by a recognition rate of 
above 50 per cent), one can see that citizens from Syria, Afghan-
istan, Iraq, Eritrea, Somalia and Yemen also make significant 
use of legal pathways to come to Europe (see Table 1). More 
relevant, however, may be that they outnumber—by far—refugees 
who are resettled.
Above all, these numbers show that refugees use existing 
pathways and seek individual solutions outside of the refugee 
regime—if their resources and networks allow them to do so.
Strong human, social and/or financial capital—Little to no 
support is needed 
There is a significant number of refugees who never enter the 
refugee protection regime. Their human and social capital, in 
the form of family, social or professional networks, allows them 
to move from countries of persecution or war to safety, arriving 
(or, as ‘refugees sur place’, already staying) in EU countries on 
residence permits based on work, family or education. Despite 
several shortcomings with available data, a 2021 OECD– 
UNHCR study mapped the residence permits issued by OECD 
countries and Brazil to citizens of seven major source countries 
of refugees with high recognition rates, namely Afghanistan, 
Eritrea, Iran, Iraq, Somalia, Syria and Venezuela, which together 
were the source of 62 per cent of displaced persons in 2019 
(OECD & UNHCR, 2021). According to their calculation, near-
ly 1.5 million first-time residence permits were granted between 
2010 and 2019 to citizens of these countries on the grounds of 
family, work or study. Of these permits, 67 per cent were granted 
for family reasons, 18 per cent were given for study, and 13 per 
cent were granted for work purposes (OECD & UNHCR, 2021). 




Family Work Education Total 2010-2019 2010-2019
Syria 257,834 10,497 13,986 282,317 54,050 991,270 94%
Afghanistan 61,696 1,632 3,014 66,342 4,240 270,085 52%
Iraq 91,228 7,007 6,580 104,815 3,345 213,835 58%
Eritrea 36,442 319 499 37,260 6,660 131,245 89%
Somalia 46,414 153 393 46,960 4,420 90,165 64%
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These refugees may possess education or skills in demand in 
other countries but lack the necessary network, financial means 
or knowledge of how to access such opportunities or even 
to make their skills known to potential employers. This, for 
instance, holds true for a significant share of persons living in 
situations of protracted displacement in Jordan (see Tobin et 
al., 2021) and Ethiopia (see Tufa et al., 2021). It is this group 
of people with limited human and social capital for whom 
complementary pathways could become a game-changer. Well 
placed, complementary pathways could step in to provide a 
network where they are lacking or strengthen networks that are 
too weak. In this context, complementary pathways could allow 
refugees to utilise their human capital if mobility is added to the 
equation—facilitated, for instance, via family links or work or 
education channels.
Thus, it becomes clear that tapping into the potential of comple-
mentary pathways does not necessarily demand new pathways. 
What it requires, however, is that policymakers invest in: 
1 building and leveraging quality networks to enable displaced 
people to utilise their resources, and 
2 adjusting entry conditions by making visa regulations more 
flexible and reducing bureaucracy.
No to very weak human, social and/or financial capital—High 
level of support is needed
At the other end of the spectrum, many displaced people possess 
neither the financial means nor the necessary human or social 
capital. This makes them most vulnerable to becoming stuck in 
protracted displacement situations and limits their chances of 
finding safety. The international protection regime developed 
a very special system to compensate for the lack of financial 
means or capital among the most vulnerable—the instrument of 
resettlement, one of the durable solutions for refugees. Con-
ceived as a protection tool, it offers the greatest support to the 
most vulnerable by offering an organised system well embedded 
in the international protection framework and overseen by a 
specialised agency, UNHCR. However, only 0.5 per cent of 
the 20.4 million refugees under UNHCR’s mandate worldwide 
were resettled in 2019 (UNHCR, 2020, p. 48), illustrating that 
the need far exceeds the opportunity. And this need is growing: 
In 2021, UNHCR estimates that global resettlement needs will 
slightly increase to 1,445,383 persons as compared to 1,440,408 
in 2020 (UNHCR, 2020b).
Limited human, social and/or financial capital—Targeted  
support is needed
Finally, there is the group of refugees who may not be among the 
most vulnerable and who are thus not targeted for resettlement, 
but whose human or social capital may not be strong enough to 
facilitate independent access to solutions abroad. For instance, 
they may have family members abroad with whom they wish to 
unite, but they may not be related closely enough to qualify for 
the narrow family definition that allows for family reunification.
Figure	3:	Policy	implications	for	complementary	pathways 
©	ICMPD,	Martin	Wagner,	Camilla Fogli
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4	 Policy	implications:	Networks	+	mobility	=	
complementary pathways
Complementary pathways are high on the agenda at the global 
and EU level. Yet much uncertainty remains regarding the use—
and ultimate impact—of this tool. States are often reluctant to 
introduce new pathways, which might be but one of the reasons 
why complementary pathways receive much attention from 
academics but far less from national governments. Addition-
ally, complementary pathways suffer from an understandable 
but ill-advised divide between refugees, who are understood 
as primarily in need of protection, and migrants, who are seen 
as moving for economic, educational or private reasons. This 
divide is strongly reflected in national migration management 
systems and presents a formidable challenge for determining 
responsibility for a tool like complementary pathways, which 
caters to the “legal mobility” of “refugees”. If this divide can be 
successfully overcome, complementary pathways could become 
a successful tool in the future.
5	 Conclusions:	Six	ways	to	move	forward	
on complementary pathways
The increased interest around complementary pathways, com-
bined with the abovementioned examples, show that it is a prom-
ising way for expanding solutions for refugees. However, basing 
complementary pathways on refugees’ capital and networks in 
many ways remains to be tapped and tested.The points below 
highlight ways that European Union and other policymakers can 
make better use of this instrument.
First, in acknowledging the human and social capital that 
refugees possess, complementary pathways could become a tool 
that offers refugees the possibility to seize opportunities based 
on their skills and networks. 
Second, refugees have social and professional networks, which 
are often too weak to capitalise on. Complementary pathways in 
this context shall set up networking strategies to make refugees’ 
connections stronger. Networks in receiving countries may 
develop further around the community sponsorship schemes 
that are gaining increased momentum, as this approach encour-
ages and allows for flexible refugee support networks. These 
networks can be based on communities, individuals, employers, 
universities, faith groups or civil society. They may also be 
broadened to encompass family sponsorship schemes and thus 
widen the possibilities for family reunification, even if the tight 
definition of family would normally not allow for this. Networks 
in receiving countries, however also require corresponding 
structures in key countries of first asylum, where refugees can 
connect, for instance, to learn about education and employment 
opportunities and to navigate the required bureaucracy—a po-
tential new area of action for development actors and embassies 
of potential refugee-receiving countries.
Third, refugees whose human or social capital offer them the 
prospect of a livelihood in a third country, such as being received 
by a community or having reasonable prospects of employ-
ment, should also be met with more flexibility regarding their 
entry conditions. A sense of flexibility shall not provide new 
refugee-specific pathways with more exclusive mobility rights 
but should rather extend to waiving entry conditions of existing 
pathways that may be difficult for refugees to fulfil (e.g. because 
of a lack of required documentation) and thus constitute the 
main hindrance to a third-country solution. 
Fourth, current governance structures segregate the admission 
of refugees from that of other legal migrants. Complementary 
pathways for refugees are orphans in this governance struc-
ture, as they organisationally fit neither under the former nor 
the latter. Furthermore, investing in network opportunities for 
refugees requires initiatives in Europe and first countries of asy-
lum, demanding policies that encompass the EU’s internal and 
external dimension and involve different actors (DG HOME and 
DG INTPA). Progress on complementary pathways, therefore, 
requires actors to overcome sectoral governance approaches 
and seek synergies between these areas.
Fifth, the connection of networks and facilitated admission 
opportunities for refugees, as proposed in this brief, could 
build on lessons learned from initiatives such as the German 
Western Balkans Regulation. Additionally, further research 
on the legal pathways that people from major refugee source 
countries take without entering the refugee regime may inform 
policies that can help strengthen refugee networks to leverage 
complementary pathways to protection. 
Sixth and finally, enabling refugees to capitalise upon their 
resources, connections and skills to access third-country 
solutions could, in turn, create more space for those refugees 
who are lacking social, human and financial capital and who 
need more support from the international community—ulti-
mately enabling these pathways to become truly complementary 
instruments for refugees to access protection.
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